Your 11.11 Sales Broke Records. So Why Did You Make Less Money?

The dangerous economics of marketplace promotions in Southeast Asia, and how FMCG brands can stop buying revenue at the expense of profit.

Every November, something remarkable happens inside FMCG companies across Southeast Asia. Sales dashboards start turning green, order notifications arrive faster than warehouses can process them, and marketing teams proudly announce that their 11.11 campaigns have broken another record. The numbers certainly look impressive. Orders have doubled or tripled, revenue is reaching unprecedented levels, advertising impressions are climbing, and the company is selling more products in a few days than it would normally sell in several weeks. Management congratulates the e-commerce team, screenshots of the results circulate through company WhatsApp groups, and everyone starts looking forward to an even bigger campaign the following year.

Then December arrives, and the finance department begins reconciling marketplace settlements, promotional expenses, advertising invoices, affiliate commissions, logistics deductions and customer refunds. What initially appeared to be an extraordinary commercial success suddenly looks considerably less impressive. The company sold more products, generated more revenue and worked significantly harder than usual, yet the additional profit is disappointingly small. In some cases, the total contribution generated by the promotion is actually lower than what the business would have earned through its normal sales activities. This is usually the moment when somebody finally asks the question that should have been raised before the campaign started: did we genuinely grow the business, or did we simply spend a great deal of money making our sales dashboard look beautiful?

With 11.11.2026 approaching, this is precisely the question FMCG manufacturers, importers, distributors and brand owners should be asking. The issue is not whether marketplace promotions work, because they clearly generate enormous amounts of commercial activity. The real question is whether the additional activity creates enough economic value to justify the investment, operational effort and margin sacrifices required to generate it.

Key Takeaways

• Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) Is Not Contribution Profit: Marketplace sales spikes flatter the top line while compounding seller discounts, category commissions, fulfillment penalties, and ad spend that can eliminate operating margin.
• The Stacking Cost Problem: Evaluating discounts, advertising budgets, affiliate commissions, and shipping subsidies in departmental silos hides the fact that they all hit the same completed transaction.
• The 68% Margin Compression Reality: A product generating Rp21,550 in baseline contribution per unit can collapse to Rp6,850 during an aggressive mega-sale. To match normal earnings, order volume must surge over 300%.
• High ROAS Can Be an Expensive Illusion: An attributed Return on Ad Spend of 6.0 looks stellar on a marketing dashboard, but reveals zero information about whether the remaining order margin covers seller deductions and returns.
• Demand Cannibalization vs. Incremental Growth: Aggressive discounts frequently subsidize loyal consumers stocking up on December and January replenishment rather than acquiring high-lifetime-value new buyers.

Southeast Asia Has Become Very Good at Selling Things Online

There is no question that e-commerce represents an enormous commercial opportunity for consumer goods companies. According to Momentum Works' April 2026 Ecommerce in Southeast Asia report, the region's platform-based gross merchandise value reached approximately US$157.6 billion in 2025, representing growth of 22.8% over the previous year. Indonesia remained the region's largest individual market, while Shopee, TikTok Shop including Tokopedia, and Lazada collectively accounted for almost 99% of Southeast Asia's platform e-commerce GMV. These numbers illustrate just how important online marketplaces have become to the region's retail landscape, particularly for FMCG businesses that once considered e-commerce little more than an additional distribution channel.

Consumers throughout Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore increasingly purchase cosmetics, personal-care products, household cleaning products, packaged foods, beverages and other everyday necessities through digital platforms. Shopping festivals such as 9.9, 10.10, 11.11 and 12.12 have become major commercial events, supported by extensive advertising, livestreaming, influencers, affiliate networks, discounts and increasingly sophisticated fulfilment operations. During Indonesia's 2025 11.11 campaign, for example, Lazada reported that LazMall products generated more than 23 times their usual sales during the four-day promotional period. For brands seeking greater consumer exposure and rapid volume growth, the attraction of participating in these campaigns is understandably considerable.

However, there is an important distinction between the commercial success of a marketplace and the financial success of the companies selling through it. Gross merchandise value measures the value of transactions passing through a platform, but it says relatively little about the contribution earned by individual manufacturers, distributors or sellers. A promotion can be enormously successful for the marketplace, extremely attractive to consumers and financially disappointing for the brands funding much of the activity. All three things can happen simultaneously, and I would argue that many FMCG companies still underestimate how frequently their promotional decisions expose them to exactly this situation.

The Difference Between Selling More and Making More

Consider an Indonesian personal-care company selling shampoo through Shopee, Tokopedia and TikTok Shop. Its product has a regular listed selling price of Rp100,000, and under normal trading conditions the company offers relatively modest promotional support while maintaining predictable advertising expenditure and a healthy contribution from each completed order. As 11.11 approaches, the e-commerce team proposes a more aggressive campaign involving deeper discounts, additional advertising, shipping support and affiliate participation. The anticipated volume increase is substantial, and management is presented with a forecast showing that the business could sell two and a half times its normal number of orders.

The commercial reasoning is understandable. Higher volumes should improve product visibility, increase marketplace rankings, attract new buyers and potentially create opportunities for future repeat purchases. The problem is that each additional promotional mechanic has a cost, and these costs are frequently evaluated individually rather than as part of the economics of a completed transaction. A seller-funded discount might look manageable, the proposed advertising budget might appear reasonable, and the affiliate commission might be justified by the additional exposure. Yet when all those costs are applied to the same order, the outcome can be very different from what the original sales forecast suggested.

To illustrate the problem, consider the following simplified financial model. These figures are hypothetical and are intended to demonstrate the economics rather than represent the actual fees charged by any particular platform. The example assumes one unit per order, consistent manufacturing costs and a platform-fee assumption of 8% of net product revenue, with other promotional and fulfilment expenses shown separately.

A Rp100,000 Product With Two Very Different Outcomes

Metric (Per completed order)	Normal trading	11.11 campaign
Listed selling price	Rp100,000	Rp100,000
Seller-funded discount	-Rp10,000	-Rp20,000
Net product revenue	Rp90,000	Rp80,000
Product cost	-Rp48,000	-Rp48,000
Platform fee (8%)	-Rp7,200	-Rp6,400
Order processing	-Rp1,250	-Rp1,250
Shipping support	-Rp3,000	-Rp4,000
Advertising allocation	-Rp4,000	-Rp5,000
Affiliate commission	Rp0	-Rp3,000
Fulfilment	-Rp4,000	-Rp4,000
Expected returns and claims	-Rp1,000	-Rp1,500
Contribution per order	Rp21,550	Rp6,850

Under normal circumstances, the company generates Rp21,550 in contribution from each completed order. During the promotional campaign, that contribution falls to just Rp6,850, representing a reduction of approximately 68%. The product remains contribution-positive, which means every additional completed order still generates some economic value before fixed overheads and other unallocated expenses. However, the company now needs to sell dramatically more products to achieve the same total contribution it would have earned through normal trading.

Suppose the business normally sells 1,000 orders, generating Rp90 million in net product revenue and Rp21.55 million in contribution. During 11.11, the campaign delivers the expected 2,500 orders, generating Rp200 million in net product revenue but only Rp17.125 million in contribution. Order volume has increased by 150%, and net product revenue has grown by approximately 122%, yet the business has generated around 21% less contribution. Management can truthfully announce record-breaking sales, while finance can equally truthfully report that the company made less money from those sales.

What makes this particularly dangerous is that the promotional result may appear successful when viewed through the individual performance indicators used by different departments. The e-commerce team exceeded its volume target, marketing generated substantial traffic and the warehouse processed an impressive number of orders. None of these achievements is necessarily fictitious or unimportant, but together they have failed to produce the economic outcome the business should have wanted. If the campaign also required warehouse overtime, emergency stock transfers, extra packaging or additional administrative work that was not included in the calculation, the final result could be even less attractive.

The Break-Even Promotional Volume Equation

Before agreeing to participate in a marketplace mega-sale, commercial leaders should determine the exact volume required to avoid losing money compared to normal trading. The formula is straightforward:

$$\text{Required Promotional Volume} = \frac{\text{Normal Order Volume} \times \text{Normal Contribution Per Order}}{\text{Promotional Contribution Per Order}}$$

Using our shampoo example:

$$\text{Required Promotional Volume} = \frac{1,000 \times \text{Rp21,550}}{\text{Rp6,850}} \approx 3,146 \text{ orders}$$

To earn the same Rp21.55 million total contribution, the brand had to ship 3,146 orders—an increase of 215% in completed deliveries. An aggressive sales forecast of 2,500 orders looked superficially ambitious (+150%), but was economically underwater from day one. (For a related discussion on deconstructing top-line value versus real physical volume, see Your Sales Are Up 30%. How Many Units Actually Sold?).

The Hidden Cost Stack Behind Marketplace Promotions

One reason companies repeatedly encounter this problem is that the complete cost of marketplace selling rarely belongs to a single department. Sales departments focus on prices, volumes and promotional discounts, while marketing manages advertising campaigns, influencers, content creators and livestream activities. Operations deals with packaging, logistics and fulfilment, and finance eventually receives the settlements and invoices that reveal how much of the apparent revenue the company has actually retained. Each department may be working competently within its own budget, yet the combined decisions can gradually destroy the contribution that makes the business economically sustainable.

Seller-funded vouchers provide a useful example. A Rp10,000 discount appears to be a straightforward reduction in the selling price, but marketplace promotional programmes can involve different funding arrangements. Some vouchers are entirely funded by the seller, others by the platform, and some involve a combination of both. A consumer may see the same final price regardless of the arrangement, but the financial result for the manufacturer can be substantially different. Treating every promotional incentive as a seller-funded deduction, or assuming the platform will absorb a discount without verifying the arrangement, can produce misleading profitability calculations.

Shipping support creates similar complications, particularly in Indonesia, where delivery costs can vary significantly depending on the consumer's location, the product's weight and the fulfilment arrangement being used. A relatively inexpensive personal-care product may still carry a meaningful shipping burden, especially when sold individually rather than as part of a larger basket. Affiliate commissions and promotional advertising introduce additional complexity because different marketing activities may receive credit for influencing the same purchase. Without careful measurement, a business can easily end up paying for several acquisition channels while believing that each one independently generated the entire sale.

This becomes particularly problematic when teams rely on generic assumptions about marketplace commissions. Actual charges can vary by category, seller classification, programme participation and additional services, and these arrangements can change over time. Shopee Indonesia, for example, distinguishes between administrative fees, order-processing charges and other applicable service costs. In addition, regulatory deductions such as withholding taxes (see What Indonesia’s Marketplace Tax Collection Actually Does to Your SKU Margin) mean payout cash timing differs substantially from gross transaction value. The correct approach is therefore to build promotional calculations using the actual terms and settlement data relevant to the specific seller and product category, rather than relying on a standard percentage that may no longer reflect the company's real operating conditions.

Why Return on Ad Spend Can Be a Dangerous Comfort

Return on Ad Spend, generally referred to as ROAS, has become one of the dominant measures of e-commerce marketing performance. There is nothing inherently wrong with the metric, since it indicates how much attributed revenue is generated relative to advertising expenditure. Problems arise when management starts treating a strong ROAS as evidence that a campaign is financially successful, without considering what remains after all the other costs of generating and fulfilling those sales. A metric that was designed to measure advertising efficiency gradually becomes a substitute for measuring the profitability of the underlying business.

Imagine that an FMCG company spends Rp10 million on marketplace advertising and generates Rp60 million in attributed net sales. The ROAS is 6, which many marketing teams would consider a respectable result, particularly during a highly competitive promotional event. However, that figure does not tell us whether the products have a 50% contribution margin before advertising or a 10% margin, nor does it explain how much was spent on vouchers, shipping support, fulfilment, affiliate commissions and other transaction-related costs. A ROAS of 6 could therefore represent an excellent commercial investment, a marginal result or a campaign that loses money.

The opposite is also possible. A campaign with a relatively modest ROAS might still generate an attractive economic return if it sells high-contribution products, creates valuable incremental demand or introduces new customers who subsequently become profitable repeat buyers. This is why I believe FMCG companies should stop allowing individual marketing efficiency metrics to dominate promotional decision-making. ROAS, conversion rates, average order values and GMV all provide useful information, but none of them should replace a proper understanding of contribution margins and customer economics.

Did You Acquire New Consumers, or Simply Sell December's Shampoo in November?

There is another dimension of marketplace promotions that deserves considerably more attention: the difference between genuinely incremental demand and sales that have simply been brought forward from a future period. An existing customer who normally purchases shampoo every six weeks might decide to buy two or three bottles during 11.11 because the discount is unusually attractive. The marketplace records an increase in transactions or units sold, and the brand receives immediate revenue. However, that same consumer may now have enough shampoo to postpone their next purchase until January, meaning the promotion has not necessarily increased their overall consumption or lifetime purchasing value.

This behaviour is particularly relevant for FMCG categories with predictable replenishment patterns, including detergents, household cleaners, personal-care products, skincare and many packaged food products. Consumers often use promotional events to stock up on products they already intended to purchase, especially when the products have long shelf lives and the savings are substantial. Stock-up behaviour is not necessarily undesirable because it may strengthen brand loyalty, discourage competitor switching or improve household penetration. Nevertheless, it is commercially very different from acquiring a genuinely new customer or convincing an existing customer to increase their overall consumption.

A business that celebrates a 150% increase in November order volume should therefore examine what happens in December and January before declaring victory. If sales subsequently decline because consumers have already purchased their requirements, part of the apparent growth was merely a shift in purchasing timing. The company may have sacrificed contribution on products that consumers would eventually have purchased at a higher price anyway. Without measuring post-promotional performance and comparing customer cohorts, it is extremely difficult to distinguish valuable incremental growth from expensive demand acceleration.

This is also why the distinction between existing customers and new-to-brand consumers matters so much. A brand might rationally accept lower first-order contribution to attract customers who later make multiple profitable purchases. That investment becomes more difficult to justify when the discount is primarily consumed by loyal buyers who would have purchased regardless. Ideally, companies should measure new-customer acquisition, repeat purchases, product replenishment and total contribution over a meaningful period rather than treating the promotional event itself as the final commercial outcome.

The Bestselling Product Is Not Necessarily the Best Product to Promote

Most FMCG companies naturally select their bestselling SKUs for major marketplace campaigns. These products have established demand, relatively strong conversion rates, accumulated customer reviews and enough consumer recognition to attract attention during a busy shopping event. From a sales perspective, this makes sense because management wants products that can deliver predictable volume. From a profitability perspective, however, it can be considerably less logical, particularly when bestselling products already operate on relatively narrow contribution margins.

A popular shampoo might attract thousands of orders while generating very little contribution after discounts and promotional expenses. A related conditioner, treatment product or bundle could potentially produce a more attractive financial result despite selling fewer units. Likewise, a household cleaning company might earn better contribution from a three-product pack than from an aggressively discounted individual bottle, partly because some order-processing and fulfilment expenses do not increase proportionally with the number of items in an order. The commercial objective should therefore be to identify products and combinations that offer an attractive balance between consumer demand, incremental volume and contribution, rather than automatically allocating promotional budgets to the highest-volume SKUs.

Pack-price architecture becomes especially important in this environment. Carefully designed multipacks, product bundles and complementary product combinations can improve basket economics while helping consumers discover more of the brand's assortment. However, bundles are not automatically more profitable, since additional product costs, packaging, weight and shipping expenses may offset the benefits of a higher order value. The objective is not simply to increase average basket size or encourage consumers to purchase more units. It is to create baskets that generate enough additional contribution to justify the incentives used to sell them.

Sometimes Losing Money on a Promotion Makes Commercial Sense

None of this means that FMCG companies should avoid aggressive promotions or insist that every transaction generates an immediate positive contribution. There are legitimate circumstances in which accepting lower margins or even a controlled short-term loss makes commercial sense. A new entrant to the Indonesian market may need to invest heavily in consumer awareness, product trial and marketplace credibility before it can achieve sustainable sales. An established manufacturer launching a new product may see 11.11 as an opportunity to reach consumers who would otherwise be expensive to acquire, while a business holding ageing inventory might reasonably prefer a controlled promotional loss to an even larger inventory write-down later.

The difference between a sensible commercial investment and a poorly managed promotion is whether the company understands what it is buying with its money. If management is investing in customer acquisition, it should have a reasonable estimate of the cost of acquiring incremental customers, their likely repeat-purchase behaviour and the contribution they may generate over time. If the objective is inventory liquidation, the campaign should be evaluated against the realistic financial consequences of holding, discounting or disposing of that inventory. A product-trial campaign should be judged partly on whether consumers subsequently purchase the product at commercially sustainable prices.

I have no objection to FMCG companies spending money to create future growth, provided they can explain the economic logic behind that expenditure. A deliberate investment of Rp20 million to acquire a measurable group of potentially valuable repeat customers may be entirely justified, depending on the supporting evidence and expected payback. Losing the same amount because nobody calculated the combined cost of discounts, advertising, commissions and shipping support is something very different. One represents a considered commercial decision, while the other represents a failure of basic management discipline.

How I Would Prepare an FMCG Business for 11.11

If I were preparing an FMCG company for this year's 11.11 campaign, the first thing I would do is move the discussion away from sales forecasts and toward the actual economics of each important SKU. I would ask the e-commerce team and finance department to agree on a single model that distinguishes listed prices, seller-funded discounts, platform-funded incentives, product costs, platform charges, advertising, affiliate commissions, fulfilment, shipping participation and expected refunds or returns. That model should be based on completed orders and realistic cost assumptions, with a separate reconciliation of marketplace settlements, cash received and relevant tax treatment. This distinction is particularly important in Indonesia, where tax withholding and the timing of marketplace settlements can affect immediate cash availability without necessarily representing equivalent permanent operating expenses.

Once the underlying economics are understood, I would challenge the promotional assortment and proposed discounts. A product should not receive additional promotional support merely because it is popular or because the platform has offered attractive campaign visibility. Every significant promotional SKU should have an estimated contribution per completed order, a realistic volume forecast and a clearly understood minimum commercially acceptable selling price. Management should be able to see how changes in voucher funding, advertising costs or affiliate participation affect the economics before approving the campaign, rather than discovering the consequences when the settlement reports arrive.

The next step would be to challenge the sales forecasts themselves, particularly where the expected increase in volume appears impressive but may not be sufficient to compensate for lower margins. Returning to our earlier example, the company generating Rp21.55 million in contribution from 1,000 normal orders would need approximately 3,146 promotional orders at Rp6,850 contribution each merely to match that result. The forecast of 2,500 orders appeared attractive because it represented a 150% increase in volume, but economically it was still insufficient. That is precisely the kind of calculation management should see before approving promotional expenditure.

I would then examine where incremental demand is expected to come from. If the forecast assumes that large numbers of existing customers will buy additional products, we need to consider whether they are increasing their consumption or simply purchasing earlier. If the business expects to acquire new consumers, it should establish how those customers will be identified and how their repeat purchasing will be assessed after the campaign. These questions are more difficult than forecasting GMV, but they are essential if management wants to understand whether the promotion is building the business or simply creating a temporary spike in commercial activity.

Finally, I would insist that the campaign review continues beyond 11 November. Initial sales figures may be available almost immediately, but genuine financial performance becomes clearer as orders are completed, refunds and returns are processed, marketing invoices arrive and marketplace settlements are reconciled. The company should also monitor subsequent sales patterns and customer behaviour to determine whether the campaign created lasting demand or simply borrowed revenue from future months. A promotional review that ends when the marketplace announces its record GMV figures is unlikely to provide management with the information needed to make better decisions next year.

What I Actually Want to See in the Post-Campaign Report

When reviewing an 11.11 campaign, I would be considerably less interested in an opening presentation dominated by sales records, advertising impressions and promotional rankings than in a straightforward explanation of the underlying economics. I would want to know how much net product revenue the business earned from completed orders after seller-funded discounts and refunds, and how much contribution remained after the relevant product, platform, marketing, logistics and fulfilment costs. These figures should be presented not only at the total campaign level but also for the most important SKUs, so that management can identify where promotional spending created value and where it merely increased activity.

I would also want to understand how much of the sales increase represented genuinely incremental demand. That means examining new-to-brand customer acquisition, existing customer purchasing patterns, repeat orders and any apparent movement of future demand into the promotional period. The analysis does not have to be academically perfect to be useful, but it should be sufficiently credible to challenge the assumption that all additional orders represent additional business. Where customer-level data is incomplete, comparisons with historical purchasing patterns, comparable products and subsequent sales performance can still provide valuable commercial insight.

The final part of the review should connect the economic performance with the company's cash position and operational execution. A promotion may generate positive contribution but still create temporary working-capital pressure because inventory must be purchased before marketplace settlements are received. Conversely, strong cash receipts immediately after a campaign do not prove that the underlying activity was profitable, particularly when returns, invoices and other expenses remain outstanding. Management needs to understand profitability, cash availability and operational performance as related but distinct elements of the same commercial decision.

The Most Dangerous Words in FMCG E-Commerce: "But Sales Were Fantastic"

Marketplace promotions are not going away, nor should they. Online retail, content commerce, livestreaming and affiliate ecosystems have become important parts of consumer purchasing behaviour throughout Southeast Asia, and brands that ignore these channels risk missing genuine opportunities for distribution, product discovery and customer acquisition. The challenge is not to avoid promotional activity but to become more disciplined about where money is invested, which consumers are being acquired and whether the resulting sales generate meaningful economic value.

This requires a much closer relationship between commercial management, marketing, operations and finance than many FMCG companies currently maintain. Marketing teams need to understand contribution margins, sales teams need to recognise the complete cost of promotional mechanics, finance teams need to appreciate the longer-term value of customer acquisition, and operations teams need to understand how fulfilment decisions affect the profitability of different orders and product combinations. These responsibilities cannot remain isolated when every decision ultimately affects the economics of the same consumer transaction.

A successful 11.11 campaign should create consumer excitement, generate commercial momentum and strengthen the brand's competitive position. It should also make economic sense, whether through immediate contribution or through a clearly justified investment in future business. Record-breaking sales figures are worth celebrating when they represent genuine commercial progress, but they become considerably less impressive when the business has sacrificed more value than it created.

Before approving this year's promotional budget, I would therefore ask management to answer three relatively simple questions. How much contribution do we expect to generate from each completed order, how many orders will we need to justify the promotional investment, and what lasting commercial value do we expect from the consumers we acquire? If those questions cannot be answered with reasonable confidence, the campaign probably requires more preparation, regardless of how attractive the sales forecast appears.

Because when the campaign ends, I would much rather explain why we made more money than why we sold more shampoo.

And those are not always the same conversation.

Put Your Own Numbers Into the Model

Before committing to the next major marketplace promotion, calculate what your actual SKUs earn after discounts, platform fees, advertising, shipping support and fulfilment. The FMCG by Alex Indonesia Marketplace Margin Calculator is designed to help sellers and brand owners understand the relationship between sales growth, marketplace costs, contribution margins and settlement cash. It is a practical starting point for challenging promotional plans before committing additional commercial resources.

Further Reading and Sources

• Momentum Works — Ecommerce in Southeast Asia 2026
• Lazada's 11.11 2025 campaign performance
• Shopee Indonesia — Seller Terms and Fees
• FMCG by Alex — Knowledge Base
• FMCG Distributor Database

FAQ

Why do FMCG brands make less profit despite record 11.11 sales?

FMCG brands frequently generate less net profit during 11.11 campaigns because promotional mechanics stack up on each completed order. Deep seller-funded discounts, platform category commission fees, increased pay-per-click advertising, affiliate commissions, shipping subsidies, and higher return rates all erode per-unit margins simultaneously. When contribution per order drops by 60% to 70%, even a 150% surge in order volume is insufficient to match regular non-promotional profit.

How do you calculate whether an 11.11 marketplace discount makes economic sense?

Calculate the Break-Even Promotional Volume using the formula: Normal Order Volume multiplied by Normal Contribution Per Order, divided by the Promotional Contribution Per Order. If the required promotional volume exceeds your warehouse fulfillment capacity, available inventory, or realistic market demand, the campaign will dilute total contribution profit regardless of top-line revenue records.

Why can a high ROAS (Return on Ad Spend) be misleading during mega shopping campaigns?

ROAS measures attributed gross or net revenue relative to ad spend, but completely ignores the underlying cost of goods sold (COGS), seller vouchers, platform fees, shipping support, and returns. An e-commerce campaign with a ROAS of 6.0 can still lose money if the gross product margin is narrow or if voucher deductions and platform charges exceed the remaining gross profit after advertising.

What is forward-buying or demand acceleration in FMCG e-commerce?

Forward-buying occurs when existing brand consumers take advantage of steep 11.11 discounts to stock up on predictable replenishment categories like shampoo, detergent, or skincare. The brand generates a high transaction volume in November, but suffers a corresponding drop in normal-price sales during December and January. The promotion merely accelerates future demand at a discounted price rather than driving incremental consumption.

Which FMCG products should brands promote during 11.11 shopping festivals?

Instead of defaulting to high-velocity bestselling SKUs with narrow margins, brands should prioritize multipacks, curated product bundles, or high-margin complementary SKUs (such as conditioners, serums, or specialty formats). Bundles improve order basket economics because fixed order-processing and shipping costs are amortized over higher transaction values.

When does it make commercial sense to accept lower or negative contribution during 11.11?

Accepting thin or negative first-order contribution is commercially justified when it is tied to an explicit, measurable objective: liquidating aging inventory to avoid severe future write-downs, accelerating new market entry trial, or acquiring genuinely new-to-brand consumers whose verified repeat purchase rate delivers a positive customer lifetime value (LTV).

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FMCG by Alex — Practical Commercial Strategy for Consumer Goods